Who Runs Congress’s Agencies?

Will a New Bill Finally Protect Their Independence?

While legislative branch agencies belong to Congress, not all are entirely free of executive branch entanglements. The question of how Congress chooses, oversees, and removes legislative branch agency heads is integral to the independence of the legislative branch, especially with recent White House efforts to take over or place personnel inside the Library of Congress, the Government Accountability Office, the Government Publishing Office, and the Office of Congressional Workplace Rights.

Legislative branch agencies are responsible for providing confidential legal and policy advice to Congress, conducting its oversight of the Executive branch, providing Congress with access to records, independently evaluating the state of our economy, administering the legislative branch workplace including addressing complaints concerning member misbehavior, and much more. There are very good reasons why their activities should be fully independent and separate from White House control.

A few years back we surveyed how appointments work for officers like the Architect of the Capitol, Librarian of Congress, the Director of the Government Publishing Office, the Comptroller General of the United States, and there was no consistency.

How inconsistent? Let’s provide some examples.

First, we have direct and indirect appointments by Congress. Some legislative branch agency heads, like the Congressional Budget Office Director, are appointed directly by the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, pursuant to a recommendation by the relevant committee of jurisdiction (in this case, the House and Senate Budget Committees). Others, like the Capitol Police Chief and the head of the Office of Congressional Workplace Rights, are appointed and removed by their respective boards. The Capitol Police Board is composed of the House and Senate Sergeant at Arms—themselves elected by each chamber—as well as the Architect of the Capitol. The OCWR Board is appointed by the majority and minority leaders of both chambers.

A handful of major positions, such as the Congressional Research Service Director and the Register of Copyrights, are chosen and removed by a superior at their agency, in this case, the Librarian of Congress.

A handful of agency heads are nominated by the president subject to confirmation by the Senate, such as the Librarian of Congress, the Director of the Government Publishing Office, and the Comptroller General (who heads the Government Accountability Office). The Librarian and the Comptroller General have a term of office, ten and fifteen years respectively. The term of office is intended to provide a measure of continuity and independence. For the Librarian, the term limit was recently instituted because the previous Librarian overstayed his welcome and it was expedient to have a mechanism to ensure a quiet departure. For the CG, the president is expected to select a nominee from three individuals recommended by a special commission composed of the Speaker, the President pro tempore of the Senate, the leaders of each chamber, and the chair and ranking members of the relevant committee of jurisdiction (i.e., House Oversight and Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.)

These variations aren’t the product of a coherent design. Some of them arose from the political horse-trading and blurred branch boundaries of their time. The story of the first Librarian of Congress, who also served as Clerk of the House and was Jefferson’s political ally, is a useful illustration.

The awkward firing of the Architect of the Capitol in 2023 prompted Congress to change the process whereby the AOC is appointed to a 12 member commission for a 10-year renewable term. The previous process, where the president chose and the senate confirmed, was flawed because Congress could not fire an Architect without resorting to impeachment or begging the president to act. The problem of removal of legislative branch agency heads is even sharper today, brought into focus with the president’s precipitous apparent firing of the Librarian of Congress and his apparently unlawful (but contested) effort to remove the Register of Copyrights, a subordinate officer inside the Library. Congress left the broader removal and appointment problems unresolved even though the vulnerabilities were visible.

A few weeks ago, a member of the Committee on House Administration, Rep. Griffith, introduced legislation that would attempt to adjust how appointments work at the Library of Congress and the Government Publishing Office. The 35-page bill, H.R. 6028, has a number of twists and turns, but draws inspiration from the 2023 bill in some of its formulation. Conspicuous by its absence is the Government Accountability Office, a legislative branch watchdog whose independence is guaranteed by explicit statutory protections, and which the White House and its congressional allies have aggressively targeted in their campaign to undermine Congress’s power of the purse.

We take this legislation seriously because it seems unlikely such legislation would be introduced without consultation of the three House and Senate committees of jurisdiction, and we can assume that the White House likely was consulted as well as it reflects a number of their interests.

In summary, here’s what the bill does.

An “oversight committee” of House and Senate leadership and leadership of the House Administration and Senate Rules committees would appoint the Librarian of Congress and GPO director and remove them by majority vote. It also creates a process to deal with vacancies in the office. The bill closes off any possibility of the White House filling deputy positions at the LC or GPO, as President Trump attempted to do after firing Hayden. It also addresses some administrative issues at GPO.

The bill carves out the Register of Copyrights from the appointment authority of the Librarian of Congress, instead providing for presidential nomination and senate confirmation. In addition, the Register of Copyrights would take on all the copyright administrative functions and duties currently vested in the Librarian, including rulemaking authority. The House and Senate Judiciary Committees would jointly recommend three individuals the president may consider for that role. Under the White House’s expansive views of its appointment and removal authority, employees of the copyright office would become subject to the whims of the White House. It would also establish an inspector general for the Copyright Office, housed inside the executive branch, and the Library of Congress IG would lose jurisdiction.

With that context, the Griffith bill represents a major effort to rationalize parts of the appointment system, but it would also introduce new executive branch leverage in critical areas.

Now, if I had the legislative pen and a free trip in a time machine to 2023, I would likely structure things differently. To start, I’d have a congressional commission appoint and remove all of these legislative branch officers. The commission would have standing staff members so there would be continuity in hiring the search firm, learning from mistakes with past hires, keeping in touch with the relevant members and staff from the various House and Senate committees, preserving all the paperwork, and holding some kind of public process for feedback on nominees (akin to a confirmation hearing). I’d probably move the appointment of legislative branch inspectors general to this commission, and consider moving folks like the Congressional Research Service Director and the Register of Copyrights there as well.

Given our political moment, taking the Architect of the Capitol model and applying it to the Librarian of Congress and Director of the Government Publishing Office makes a lot of sense. Congress should insist on applying it as well to the Comptroller General of the United States (a.k.a. the head of the Government Accountability Office).

Of all the legislative branch agencies vulnerable to executive encroachment, GAO is the most essential to the exercise of Congress’s power of the purse. The independence of the GAO is a crucial issue and having the president nominate a flunky to run that agency would be dangerous. GAO plays a critical role with respect to impoundments, oversight, policing the anti-deficiency act, and other matters, and we cannot afford to let it falter. With a Republican House and Senate, it’s likely a congressional selection process would result in someone with a more conservative affiliation. Even with the current process, where Congress recommends but the president nominates, Congress should refuse to confirm any nominee that doesn’t have Congress’s imprint. We need Congress’s person at the helm.

Given likely administration opposition to an independent CG, I’d attach legislation with a GAO add-on to the NDAA or to any other major moving legislation, such as the upcoming appropriations bills to keep the government (and notably the White House) open. Ideally, the legislation should move before the end of the year, when the CG retires and an acting takes his place.

I’m also not a big fan of making the Register of Copyrights a presidential appointee. The White House targeted the Register of Copyrights because the agency issued a draft report on AI that irritated some of the White House’s well-connected allies in the tech industry. I haven’t evaluated whether the report reached the right conclusion on whether the use of copyrighted works to train AI require consent of compensation to the owners of those copyrights. But I do support an independent evaluation of that topic, something which can happen under the current circumstances and would be hard-pressed to happen when the president can hire and fire the head of that agency.

I realize we’re in a brave new world where the White House asserts there’s no limit to its ability to choose who runs federal agencies. For my money, wherever the limit is to the White House’s power, that limit must protect all the legislative branch agencies. And from a purely pragmatic perspective, if Congress is to sacrifice the Register of Copyrights on the altar of expediency, it should accept no less than an independent GAO as part of the price for that bargain.

The copyright issue may create some weird cross-currents and animate opposition from current rights-holders. One test will be whether the legislation can go on suspension or creates opposition from various quarters — some Democratic, some perhaps within the Republican fold. My suspicion is that the proving ground will be the Senate, which would work to perfect the legislation and find a proper vehicle.

Both houses have the chance to do the right thing substantively and politically. We’ll have to see what happens.

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The Speaker

The reforms of the 1960s and 70s worked to concentrate procedural power in the party—as managed by leadership—to make it easier to pass legislation that most of the majority supported. The change was made to defeat Dixiecrats, who had used the seniority system to stymie reform on racial and economic issues. Later on, Democrats used the concentrated caucus power to control the consideration of legislation to prevent Republicans from enticing conservative Democratic party members to defect and oppose party-supported legislation. In recent years, in both parties, it also has been used to privilege the views of party leadership over the rank-and-file.

This method for organizing the House has been so impactful over the last several decades that congressional observers sometimes forget that projecting strong control over the majority is not an inherent job requirement of House leadership but a bargain between leaders and the rank-and-file to advance their common interests.

After concentrating unprecedented power in the hands of Speaker Mike Johnson, some members seem to be souring on the deal because he’s not living up to his end. A spate of stories last week describe some being frustrated with Johnson’s rigid control of the House agenda, including from female Republicans who suggest his perceptions of gender may play a role in their being shut out.

Much of the problem is Johnson’s agenda has been limited since passage of tax cuts to backstopping the White House. “The overriding issue is that the House has not been at the forefront of driving policymaking, or the agenda in Washington,” Rep. Kevin Kiley told the New York Times. “That is naturally going to be frustrating to members who ran for Congress to make an impact on issues they care about.” Several reports point to the shutdown-long recess Johnson called as a major point of frustration, which as we discussed with former House parliamentarian Max Spitzer could have lasted indefinitely under a plain reading of the House rules members agreed to in January.

Dissatisfied members still have a few avenues to take matters into their own hands. Last Tuesday, Rep. Anna Paulina Luna made good on her promise to file a discharge for her bill to prohibit member stock trading. (Why she decided on proposing a law rather than a resolution changing House rules is a question we have). A dozen House Republicans have signed onto a bipartisan bill extending health insurance subsidies for those buying insurance on the Affordable Care Act exchanges. House leadership’s decision to push a college athlete payment bill instead of anything that would resound with voters was met with a protest vote on the floor over its rules.

Whether or not Johnson retains his gavel is less interesting than whether members take his weak political leadership in a commanding role as evidence that this current model of House organization has too many downsides to retain. We continue to believe that rules that tolerate and respect the inherent factional splits within the parties can be paired with mechanisms to protect chamber productivity. Because it’s clear Johnson cares more about balancing White House interests with congressional action than the factional interests of his own slim majority, dissatisfied members should realize they need to explore a new leadership structure, not merely a new speaker.

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Modernization

Navigating the House office buildings could become much easier after the Committee on House Administration Subcommittee on Modernization recommended Modernization Initiatives Account funding for a digital signage and wayfinding project. The dynamic displays would be installed, if funding is approved, at nine entrances and would show committee schedules, an office directory, and other information to help visitors access the buildings.

The House Administrative Committee also fulfilled a recommendation of the Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress to allow member offices to create community resource lists on their websites to provide non-federal assistance and services information for their constituents. Previous communications standards set by the committee did not allow such lists as they could appear to be advertisements or endorsements, despite the value in having non-federal resources listed alongside federal programs. The new standards require offices to disclose they are not.

The final meeting of the Congressional Data Task Force for 2025 will take place Tuesday from 2:00-4:00 in Room B-248/B-249 of the Longworth House Office Building (near the cafeteria). Register for the event either on line or in person at this link. We are presenting a project at the meeting that captures members’ membership in the major ideological caucuses over the last three Congresses and will share more about it on the Congressional Data Coalition website.

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Corruption

President Trump pardoned Rep. Henry Cuellar, absolving him of charges that he and his wife took almost $600,000 in bribes from a state-owned company in Azerbaijan and a Mexican bank. Prosecutors had argued Cuellar offered support to Azerbaijan in its war against Armenia in exchange. Perhaps the House Ethics Committee will resume its investigation? A presidential pardon doesn’t resolve House Ethics violations.

Trump partnered with an Azerbaijan firm to build a hotel in Baku that never opened.

House Democratic leadership, of course, has stood by Cuellar during his reelection campaign under indictment in 2024.

Profit boost. Two business school scholars have found that members of Congress who ascend to leadership positions outperform their peers’ stock trade performance by 47 percentage points annually after their promotion. Before joining leadership, the researchers found no difference between them and their colleagues. They find leaders do better because they sell stocks preceding regulatory actions and purchase stocks when government contracts or favorable bills move forward. Some of their stock trades predict corporate news and draw greater returns through investments in donor owned or home-state firms.

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Security

Shortly after the FBI announced the arrest of a man suspected of planting the pipe bombs at the Democratic and Republican National Committee Headquarters near the Capitol before January 6, 2021, another Jan 6 participant showed up near Rep. Jamie Raskin’s home in Maryland. The man has previously threatened Raskin and was charged for that incident and for his Jan 6 actions. He was sentenced to time served and probation for the previous threat to Raskin and unlawful possession of firearms.